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STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintif !-Respondent, 
vs. 
CRAIG PHILLIP HAMILTON, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 
10588 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
The appellant appeals from a conviction on jury trial 
of the crime of robbery ~n the District Court of Washing-
ton County, State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The appellant was charged in separate informations 
with the crime of robbery alleged to have occurred on the 
5th day of March, 1965, in Washington County, Utah (R. 
5) 1 and with being an habitual criminal. Trial was held 
in the district court on November 4 and 5, 1965. The jury 
1 Respondent will cite the court document as R., the out of court 
hearing transcript as OT, and the testimony of Zella Riding as T. 
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returned a verdict of guilty on the robbery charge and the 
habitual criminal charge was dismissed. On November 8, 
1965, the appellant was ordered committed to the Utah 
State Prison. A motion for a new trial was subsequently 
made and thereafter denied on November 24, 1965. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent submits that the decision of the dis-
trict court should be affirmed, or in the alternative, the 
case be remanded to the district court with instructions to 
that court to hold a hearing without jury to determine 
whether there was sufficient compliance by the police with 
the principles laid down in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U. S. 
478 (1964), to have warranted consideration by the jury 
of appellant's confession. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On March 5, 1965, Zella Riding was working in a 
grocery store in St. George, Utah (T. 7, 8). At about 9:05 
p.m. she and a young boy were in the rear of the store to 
obtain groceries to restock the shelves (T. 9). On looking 
out of the area into the meat area, she noticed the appellant 
standing by the meat counter (T. 9). The appellant told 
her it was a "stick up" (T. 10). Mrs. Riding then said, 
"You're kidding," and the appellant replied he was serious 
(T. 10). He told Mrs. Riding to take the paper money from 1 
the cash register and give it to him (T. 11). Appellant 
pulled a pistol from his pocket and said he was serious (T. 
10). Mrs. Riding took the money from the cash register, 
which totaled about $100.00, and gave it to appellant who 
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then fled the store and rode away in an automobile (T. 12). 
Subsequently, Mrs. Riding identified appellant as the rob-
ber (T. 18). 
During the course of trial, certain admissions of the 
appellant were offered by the prosecution (OT 3). An out 
of court hearing was held to determine their admissibility. 
Officer Donald R. Lyman of the Salt Lake City Police De-
partment testified that before interrogating the appellant 
at the Salt Lake City jail, he advised the appellant of the 
fact that Officer Lyman was investigating a robbery 
charge, advised appellant that he could have an attorney 
and further advised appellant that anything he had to say 
would have to be voluntary and could be used against him. 
At no time did the appellant request an attorney, but he 
indicated he would make arrangements to obtain a local 
attorney (OT 5, 11, 12). Further, Officer Lyman testified 
(OT 6): 
"Q. (By Mr. Burns) Did Mr. Hamilton re-
quest an attorney? 
"A. No, he didn't." 
Subsequently, the appellant made some admissions re-
lating to the crime. The trial court overruled an objection 
to receipt of the admission on a claim that appellant had 
requested an attorney and been refused one. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ER-
ROR IN ADMITTING THE ADMISSIONS OF 
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APPELLANT SINCE (1) THE EVIDENCE 
WOULD SUPPORT A CONCLUSION APPEL-
LANT DID NOT REQUEST COUNSEL; (2) A 
REQUEST FOR COUNSEL PRIOR TO JUNE 
13, 1966, ONLY REQUIRED THAT APPEL-
LANT BE WARNED OF A RIGHT TO REMAIN 
SILENT AND (3) APPELLANT WAS ADE-
QUATELY WARNED. 
The facts in the instant case clearly support the con· 
clusion that the appellant did not request an attorney. At 
no time was there any testimony from Officer Lyman that 
after the advice he gave to the appellant that he could have 
an attorney was any request made for an attorney. In fact, 
he specifically indicated that appellant did not request an 
attorney. The only thing the appellant indicated was that 
he was going to attempt to obtain the services of a local at· 
torney. He did not request to see the local attorney at that 
time, nor was there any evidence in the record that he re· 
quested the police to obtain counsel for him or that he 
wanted counsel present at the time of his interrogation. 
Consequently, with the instant state of the record, it was 
well within the prerogative of the trial court to determine 
from the facts that there was never any request for counsel. 
This being so, it is submitted that there is no basis for the 
appellant to claim any denial of his constitutional rights. 
In Miranda v. Arizona,, ______ U. S. ______ , 16 L. E. 2d 964, 
June 13, 196, the United States Supreme Court laid down 
a rather revolutionary series of principles to govern state 
and federal police officials in the handling of interroga-
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tions when the suspect is in custody of police officers. The 
court stated generally that a suspect must be advised of an 
absolute right to remain silent, must be advised that any-
thing he says can be used in evidence against him, must be 
informed that he has a right to counsel and that if he can-
not afford counsel that counsel will be provided for him. 
Further, if the suspect indicates that he desires counsel, or 
that he does not desire to talk to the police, all interroga-
tion must cease. It might well be that if the Miranda case 
were to govern this situation, the appellant's point on ap-
peal would be well taken. However, this case is not con-
trolled by the decision in Miranda. 
Subsequent to the Miranda decision in the case of 
Johnson v. New Jersey, ______ U. S. ______ , 16 L. E. 2d 882, 
(1966), the Supreme Court of the United States indicated 
that the Miranda case was not to be applied retroactively. 
The court stated that the decision of Miranda v. Arizona 
would apply only to trials begun after the 13th day of June, 
1966. The court also indicated that the decision of Escobedo 
V. lllinois, 378 U. S. 478 (1964), was not to be applied ret-
roactively and that it was applicable only to trials com-
menced after June 22, 1964, the date of the Escobedo de-
cision. Consequently, this case is governed only by the rule 
in Escobedo v. Illinois, supra. The Escobedo rule unlike the 
Miranda rule does not require termination of an interroga-
tion on the request for counsel. 
There has, of course, been a substantial argument 
raised as to the effect of the Escobedo decision. The over-
whelming majority of cases as are noted in the dissenting 
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opinions in the Miranda case had construed Escobedo to 
be applicable only where the defendant requested counsel 
and was denied the opportunity to consult with counsel. In-
deed, the appellant in his brief acknowledges the variance of 
authority. cf. People v. Hartgraves, 202 N. E. 2d 33 (Ill. 
1964); State v. Hall, 397 P. 2d 261 (1964); State v. Faux, 
131 N. W. 84 (Iowa 1964); Anderson v. State, 205 A. 2d 
281 (Md. 1964); Bean v. Nevada, 398 P. 2d 251 (Nev. 
1965); Davidson v. Uni'.ted States, 347 F. 2d 530, 534 (10th 
Cir. 1965); United States v. Childress, 347 F. 2d 488 (7th 
Cir. 1965). The cases are collected in the Miranda decision 
and in the Brief of Amicus Curiae in Escobedo Cases, by 
Ronald Sokol, 1966. The question then is whether Escobedo 
required a request for counsel before a warning was re· 
quired? 
In Johnson v. New Jersey, supra, the court stated: 
"As for the stndards laid down one week ago 
in Miranda, if we were persuaded that they had 
been fully anticipated by the holding in Escobedo, 
we would measure their prospectivity from the same 
date. Defendants still to be tried at that time would 
be entitled to strict observance of constitutional doc· 
trines already clearly foreshadowed. The disagree· 
ments among other courts concerning the implica· 
tions of Escobedo, however, have impelled us to lay 
down additional guidelines for situations not pre· 
sented by that case. This we have done in Miranda, 
and these O'uidelines are therefore available only to 
persons whose trials had not begun as of June 13, 
1966. See Tehan v. Shott, 382 U. S., at 409, 15 L. 
Ed. 2d at 455, note 3, with reference to Malloy 1· 
Hogan, 378 U. S. 1, 12 L. Ed. 2d 653, 84 S. Ct. 1489 
( 1964), and Griffin v. Californi::i, supra." 
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The court in Johnson v. New Jersey, supra, also said that 
the courts applying the liberal rule of making advice as to 
counsel and the right to remain silent of the defendant 
mandatory before admitting a confession or admission had 
"perceived the implications of Escobedo and have therefore 
anticipated our holding in Miranda." Thus, the court ack-
nowledged that it would not read into Escobedo a require-
ment that an individual be advised as to his right to remain 
silent, unless there was an actual request for counsel. Thus, 
it is submitted that the position now urged by the appellant 
is available only to cases where the Miranda decision is ap-
plicable. In Johnson v. New Jersey, supra, the court said as 
to the meaning of Escobedo that it was limited to its pre-
cise holding apart from its broad implications. Thus, it 
stated: 
"Apart from its broad implications, the precise 
holding of Escobedo was that statements elicited by 
the police during an interrogation may not be used 
against the accused at a criminal trial, [where] 
the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into 
an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a par-
ticular suspect, the suspect has been taken into 
police custody, the police carry out a process of in-
terrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminat· 
ing statements, the suspect has requested and been 
denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, 
and the police have not effectively warned him of 
his absolute constitutional right to remain silent 
.. .' 378 U. S. at 490-491, 12 L. Ed. 2d at 986." 
Thus, it has been interpreted as saying that unless all the 
elements are present, including the request for counsel and 
the refusal to supply counsel, there is no requirement that 
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the defendant in a pre-Miranda case be advised of his right 
to remain silent. 2 Journal of the National District At- ' 
torneys' Association, p. 122 (1966). 
Consequently, even if there was no advice clearly 
spelled out to the appellant in the instant case that he had 
an absolute right to remain silent, that would not be fatal, 
if no request for counsel was, in fact, made. Since the rec- ' 
ord supports the fact that no request was made, the absence 
of advice would not preclude the appellant's conviction. 
The respondent submits in addition, that the implica-
tions in Officer Lyman's testimony were to the effect that he 
did, in fact, advise the appellant that he could remain silent. 
At the time Officer Lyman gave his testimony, the prose-
cution was not compelled as a condition precedent to ad-
mission of the evidence to show such advice. State v. Ringo, 
14 Utah 79, 377 P. 2d 646 (1963). 
Therefore, respondent requests that if this court de· 
termines that the Escobedo and Miranda decisions are 
applicable to this case, that the case be remanded to 
the district court and that under the authority in Jackson 
v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 (1964), the judge sitting without , 
jury there determine factually whether the appropriate ad· ' 
vice to remain silent was given. If the court decides that 
the appropriate advice was given, then he may affirm the 
judgment. If the court determines that the appropriate 
advice was not given, (assuming this court determines that 
a request for counsel was, in fact, made), a new trial could 
be ordered. 
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POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ER-
ROR IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT ON THE 
LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF GRAND 
LARCENY. 
The facts in the instant case disclose that the appel-
lant, while in the store where Mrs. Riding was working, 
told her that it was a stick-up, pulled a gun on her, took 
money from the cash register, and fled. All the evidence 
indicates robbery. There is no evidence of any kind to 
indicate that the sole intention of the appellant was to com-
mit larceny. Indeed, the only evidence offered by the ap-
pellant on appeal is the testimony of Mrs. Riding which 
overwhelmingly supports a conclusion that robbery was, in 
fact, committed and that that was the only crime properly 
instructed on. The trial court correctly refused the instruc-
tion on the lesser included offense. 
In a long line of decisions, this court has indicated that 
there is no need for a trial court to instruct upon a lesser 
included offense unless it is raised by the evidence. In 
State v. Angle, 61 Utah 432, 215 Pac. 531 (1923), this court 
stated: 
"It is a well-settled rule that instructions as to 
lower grades of the offenses charged should be 
given when warranted by the evidence. It is equally 
well settled that in a criminal prosecution error can-
not be predicated on the omission of the trial court 
to instruct as to lesser grades of the offense charged 
where there is no evidence to reduce the offense to 
a lesser grade. 1 Blashfield, Instructions to Juries 
(2d Ed.) § 408." 
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In State v. Ferguson, 74 Utah 263, 279 Pac. 55 (1929), this 
court again noted : 
"It is a well settled rule that instructions as to ' 
lower grades of the offense charged should be given 
when warranted by the evidence. It is equally well 
settled that in a criminal prosecution error cannot 
be predicated on the omission of the trial court to i 
instruct as to lesser grades of the offense charged, 
where there is no evidence to reduce the offense to : 
a lesser grade." 
Recently, in State v. Gleason, 17 U. 2d 149, 405 P. 2d 
( 1965) , this Court ruled that there was no reason to in· 
struct upon the lesser included offenses to the crime of 
rape. It was stated: 
"The evidence was so overwhelming that he 
committed the act that no such instruction was 
either necessary or appropriate." 
Most recently, in State v. Dodge, 415 P. 2d 212 (1966), 
counsel for the appellant raised the same contention that 
is now raised before the court. Appellant's counsel again 
fails or refuses to acknowledge the overwhelming authority 
in Utah case law that an instruction on a lesser included 
offense need not be given unless it is raised by the evidence. 
In the Dodge case, this court said: 
"The facts indisputably show he was attempt· ' 
ing to peel the safe. The jury would have been com· 
posed of unreasonable men had it even considered 
that the defendant had 'unlawfully entered' for the 
altruistic 'intent to damage property or to injure 
a person or annoy the peace and quiet of any occu· 
pant therein.' The trial court also would have b~en 
an unreasonable person had he given such an 1~· 
struction. The second degree burglary conviction 15 
affirmed.'' 
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The decision of State v. Blythe, 20 Utah 378, 38 Pac. 
1108 (1899), cited by the appellant, does not support the 
proposition for which it is cited, since in that case, the 
court merely held that the trial court's giving an instruc-
tion on a lesser included offense, to wit: attempt, and the 
jury return of a conviction on the lesser included offense, 
did not preclude the conviction, even though the evidence 
overwhelmingly demonstrated the commission of the actual 
offense. The case is of no precedential value for this ap-
peal. 
CONCLUSION 
Both issues raised by the appellant in the instant case 
are without merit. Appellant was only entitled to be ad-
vised of his right to remain silent if he made an actual 
request for counsel. Further, at the time appellant was 
prosecuted, the failure to cease interrogation, if he made 
a request for counsel, was not required. The evidence in 
the instant case clearly shows that a request for counsel was 
not made and, therefore, no warning was necessary. Con-
sequently, the only question was the voluntariness of the 
confession, which appellant does not assail. The appellant's 
contention that an instruction on the lesser included offense 
should have been given is frivolous and without merit. This 
court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN, 
Attorney General, 
RONALD N. BOYCE, 
Assistant Attorney General, 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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